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 Abstract 
A core element of economic theory is the assumption of stable preferences. We test this 
assumption in public goods games by repeatedly eliciting cooperation preferences in a fixed 
subject pool over a period of five months. We find that cooperation preferences are very 
stable at the aggregate level, but less so at the individual level. Nevertheless, individual 
preferences are sufficiently stable to predict future behavior fairly accurately. Our results 
also provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences. The 
personality dimension 'Agreeableness' is closely related to both the type and the stability of 
cooperation preferences. 
Keywords 
Social preferences, preference stability, conditional cooperation, free riding, personality, Big-
Five. 
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1. Introduction  
In  his  influential  essay  on  “The  Methodology  of  Positive  Economics”  (1953,  p.  4),  Milton 
Friedman explains that the task of economic theory “is to provide a system of generalizations that 
can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances.”  
In  brief,  economic  theory  is  about  making  predictions,  which  are  enormously  facilitated  if 
peoples' tastes are stable across time and circumstances. The assumption of stable preferences 
belongs accordingly to the core elements of economic theory, or, as Gary Becker (1976, p. 5) 
puts  it:  “The  combined  assumptions  of  maximizing  behavior,  market  equilibrium,  and  stable 
preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see 
it.”  
On  the  same  page  Becker  also  argues  that  “preferences  are  assumed  not  to  change 
substantially  over  time”.  He  explains  that  the  assumption  of  preference  stability  both  across 
different circumstances and over time “provides a stable foundation for generating predictions 
about responses to various changes, and prevents the analyst from succumbing to the temptation 
of simply postulating the required shift in preferences to “explain” all apparent contradictions to 
his  predictions.”  Whether  the  assumption  of  preference  stability  is  reasonable  for  real  world 
preferences  is  ultimately  an  empirical  question.  However,  empirical  evidence  on  preference 
stability is surprisingly scarce. 
In this paper we present experimental evidence on the stability of social preferences, more 
precisely  on  the  stability  of  preferences  for  cooperation  in  a  social  dilemma.  We  measure 
cooperation preferences by Fischbacher et al.’s (2001, henceforth FGF) variant of the four player 
one shot public goods game and repeat the measurement with the identical subject pool after two 
and a half and five months. The FGF method has the advantage of measuring cooperativeness 
independent  of  subjects’  beliefs,  which  are  presumably  more  volatile  than  preferences.
1 
Furthermore,  we  also  measure  subjects’  personality  using  the  Big Five  model,  which  is  the 
standard trait framework for research in personality (e.g., Goldberg, 1993). Our experimental 
setup enables us to investigate (i) aggregate level and individual level stability of cooperation 
                                                           
1 There is of course no way to measure preferences directly. In a strict sense it is thus impossible to test preference 
stability. We also cannot identify the proximate mechanism which causes subjects to contribute, be it interdependent 
preferences or reciprocity (see Cox, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004). However, we argue that the FGF design is a suitable mechanism to elicit revealed preferences 
for cooperation. If people have stable social preferences, they should behave identical at all three points in time, 
irrespective of what they think others will do. See also Thöni, Tyran, and Wengström (2009) on the distinction 




preferences over time, and (ii) the relationship between stable personality traits and cooperation 
preferences. 
Our paper contributes to a nascent body of literature on the stability of social preferences. 
However,  the  existing  literature  has  largely  focused  on  the  distribution  of  heterogeneous 
preference types across different experiments at the aggregate level.
2 The few studies that have 
examined individual level stability can be divided into two categories. 
The first category includes studies investigating the consistency and stability of social 
preferences across different games or variants of the same game in a given experimental session. 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) apply the axioms of revealed preferences to 
decisions  observed  in  modified  dictator  games.  They  find  that  subjects’  choices  can  be 
rationalized by a well behaved utility function. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) elicit individual 
cooperation  preferences  in  a  strategy  method  experiment  and  observe  contributions  in  ten 
consecutive one shot games in the direct response method. They find that data on individual 
cooperation preferences allow the prediction of the development of contributions over time very 
accurately.
3 Blanco et al. (in press) investigate the stability of preferences across different games 
by observing the same sample of subjects in a number of different one shot games. They find that 
about one third of their subjects exhibit stable preferences in the sense that they consistently 
follow a plausible behavioral norm.
4 
The  second  category  of  research  includes  a  very  small  number  of  studies  examining 
longitudinal  stability  of  social  preferences  over  time.  Muller  et  al.  (2008)  elicit  subjects’ 
cooperation  preferences  repeatedly  in  a  series  of  five  consecutively  played  two stage  public 
goods experiments within one session. They find that 37 percent of their 60 subjects remain in the 
same preference category for all five measurements. Studies allowing for more time between the 
measurements  are  particularly  scarce.
5  Brosig  et  al.  (2007)  implement  sequential  prisoner’s 
dilemma games and repeat the initial experiment with the same subject pool two times with one 
                                                           
2 For experiments using the FGF design see Kocher et al. (2008), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), Thöni et al. (2009). 
Homo /heterogeneity between subject pools in repeated public goods games are studied in Gächter et al. (2010).  
3 Burlando and Guala (2005) and Gächter and Thöni (2005) investigate preference stability in a setting where they 
regroup subjects according to their cooperation preferences. They use initial public goods games to identify different 
types and form groups of alike subjects and observe contributions in repeated public goods games. 
4 See also de Oliveira et al. (2009). A related strand of literature investigates whether different elicitation methods 
(strategy method vs. direct response method) lead to identical inference about subjects’ preferences, see Brandts and 
Charness (2009) for an overview or Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) for the FGF design.  
5 Horowitz (1992), Andersen et al. (2005) and Zeisberger et al. (in press) investigate the stability of risk preferences 




month in between each repetition. They find that 43 percent of the subjects choose the same 
response in all three waves, and all of these subjects act consistently selfish. On average they 
observe a decay of cooperative behavior over time. 
In  contrast  to  Brosig  et  al.  (2007),  we  observe  highly  stable  aggregate  results.  The 
distribution of cooperation preferences is basically unchanged across time. At the individual level 
we observe a more diverse picture. If we classify our subjects into three categories (Conditional 
Cooperators, Free Riders and Others) we find that about two thirds of the subjects remain in the 
same  category  for  two  consecutive  measurements.  Half  of  the  subjects  remain  in  the  same 
category for all three measurements. Furthermore, we find a relationship between preference 
stability and dispositional characteristics. In particular, the personality dimension Agreeableness, 
which is related to one’s tendency to be cooperative rather than competitive (Costa and McCrae, 
1992),  appears  to  be  part  of  the  psychological  foundations  of  cooperation  preference 
heterogeneity  and  stability.  We  find  that  Free  Riders  and  Conditional  Cooperators  are 
characterized by different levels of Agreeableness and that higher levels of Agreeableness are 
associated  with  more  stable  preferences  for  conditional  cooperation,  while  lower  levels  are 
associated  with  more  stable  preferences  for  free  riding.  The  latter  findings  contribute  to  an 
emerging research stream that seeks to identify “personality and attitude variables that allow the 
classification of subjects into different “types” whose decision behavior in social dilemmas may 
be described by alternative models” (Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993, p. 193).
6 The remainder of 
the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our experimental design and our 
questionnaire, in Section 3 we present the results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Experimental design and procedures 
The data reported in this paper come from an experimental part and a questionnaire part. In the 
experimental part we used the design introduced by FGF to measure cooperation preferences in 
public goods games. In order to analyze whether cooperation preferences are stable over time, we 
                                                           
6 The relation between personality measures and other regarding, prosocial behavior has been studied in public 
goods games (Kurzban and Houser, 2001; Perugini et al., 2010), dictator games (Ben Ner et al., 2004a,b), ultimatum 
games (Brandstätter and Königstein, 2001) and a series of distribution games (Bartling et al., 2009). Ashton et al. 
(1998)  and  Hirsh  and  Peterson  (2009)  study  the  correlation  between  personality  measures  and  nonincentiviced 
measures for cooperation. Boone et al. (1999; 2002) correlate personality measure like ‘Locus of control’ with 




replicated  the  protocol  used  by  FGF  and  repeated  our  initial  study  (Wave  1)  in  a  random 
matching mode two and a half (Wave 2) and five months (Wave 3) after the first study by 
inviting the same participants back to the laboratory. All sessions used an identical protocol in 
which subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four members. Group compositions were 
unknown to the subjects and not revealed after the experiments. The basic decision situation was 
a standard linear public goods game. Each subject received an endowment of 20 tokens and chose 
a contribution  {0,1,...,20} i c ∈  to a linear public good with a marginal per capita return of 0.4. 
The payoff function was given by 
4
1




= − + ∑ , 
where the public good is equal to the sum of the contributions of all four group members.  
In  the  experiment  subjects  had  to  make  two  types  of  contribution  decisions,  an 
‘unconditional’  and  a  ‘conditional’  contribution  to  the  public  good.  The  unconditional 
contribution was a single decision about how many of the 20 tokens to invest into the public 
good. For the conditional contribution, subjects had to fill in a table showing the 21 possible 
average contribution levels of the other three group members (rounded to integers). They were 
asked to state for each of the 21 possibilities their corresponding contribution. After all subjects 
had made both types of decisions a random mechanism determined which of the two decisions 
became outcome relevant. The random mechanism (throw of a die) selected in each group one 
subject that contributed according to his or her ‘contribution table’, while the other three group 
members contributed according to their unconditional contribution. 
We conducted our experiments in the computer lab of a European university, using the 
software  z Tree  (Fischbacher,  2007).  In  order  to  maximize  comparability  with  the  original 
experiment by FGF we replicated the same protocol and used the same parameters. We observed 
the decisions of 72 subjects at times 1 and 2. Four of these did not return for the third study 
leaving us with 68 subjects with complete information at all three points in time. The participants 
were randomly seated at separated computer terminals, received written instructions and had to 




informed about their final payoff and paid privately. On average, subjects earned about US$ 13 in 




In the experiment of Wave 1 we assessed individual differences in personality traits by a measure 
of  the  Big Five  Model  of  personality.  Personality  traits  have  an  estimated  annual  stability 
coefficient  of  0.98,  indicating  high  stability  over  lifetime  (Conley,  1985).  Research  has 
accordingly shown that subjects completing a personality questionnaire more than once will tend 
to obtain highly similar scores (e.g., McCrae and Costa, 1990). In order to reduce the potential for 
transient  measurement  errors  (e.g.,  Chmielewski  and  Watson,  2009)  we  therefore  measured 
personality  characteristics  in  Wave  1  and  did  not  repeat  the  measurement  in  the  subsequent 
waves. 
The Big Five model is the standard trait framework for research in personality (Goldberg, 
1993; John and Srivastava, 1999) and has enjoyed increasing popularity across a wide variety of 
disciplines including economics.
8 The model specifies that five overarching dimensions account 
for the biggest part of between subject variation in stable personality traits. These dimensions are 
Extraversion  (sociable,  active,  energetic),  Agreeableness  (cooperative,  considerate,  trusting), 
Conscientiousness  (dependable,  organized,  persistent),  Emotional  Stability  (calm,  secure, 
unemotional) and Openness to Experience (imaginative, intellectual, artistically sensitive). While 
we measured all five dimensions, one of them, Agreeableness, is particularly relevant for our 
study of cooperation preferences. Agreeableness is centrally related to one’s tendencies to strive 
for cooperation rather than competition (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Moreover, individuals high 
on  Agreeableness  are  generally  more  inclined  to  forgo  self interests  in  favor  of  collective 
interests than individuals low on Agreeableness (e.g., Buss, 1991; Graziano and Eisenberg, 1997; 
Koole  et  al.,  2001).  We  therefore  expected  Agreeableness  to  be  positively  correlated  with 
subjects’ cooperativeness in our experiments.  
                                                           
7 Prior to the experiment reported here subjects played a one shot public goods game and a one shot public goods 
game with punishment. Subjects did, however, not receive any information about other subjects’ decisions nor about 
their  payoff.  At  the  end  of  the  experiments  they  were  informed  only  of  their  aggregate  payoff  in  all  three 
experiments. 




We elicited personality traits by a Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), which includes 
a subscale for each of the five personality dimensions (Gosling et al., 2003). Each subscale is 
composed of two items and each item contains a pair of two trait descriptors. For example, the 
first item is: “I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic.” Subjects have to rate on a 7 point scale 
ranging from 1:‘disagree strongly’ up to 7:‘agree strongly’ the extent to which the pair of traits 
applies  to  them.  The  ten  items  are  ‘extraverted,  enthusiastic’  and  ‘reserved,  quiet’  (reverse 
scored) for the Extraversion subscale; ‘sympathetic, warm’ and ‘critical, quarrelsome’ (reverse 
scored)  for  the  Agreeableness  subscale;  ‘dependable,  self disciplined’  and  ‘disorganized, 
careless’  (reverse scored)  for  the  Conscientiousness  subscale;  ‘calm,  emotionally  stable’  and 
‘anxious, easily upset’ (reverse scored) for the Emotional Stability subscale; and ‘open to new 
experiences,  complex’  and  ‘conventional,  uncreative’  (reverse scored)  for  the  Openness  to 
Experience subscale.  
 
3. Results 
We  organize  our  results  as  follows:  We  start  by  conducting  an  instrument  check  of  our 
experiment  and  look  at  aggregate  stability  and  individual  stability.  We  then  conduct  an 
instrument  check  of  our  personality  measure  before  we  explore  the  impact  of  the  Big Five 
personality  dimensions  on  preference  heterogeneity  and  preference  stability.  Finally,  we 
investigate the predictive power of preference stability. Specifically, we use the data from the 
first and second wave to predict individual behavior in the third wave and evaluate the prediction 
with the true data. 
 
3.1 Instrument check public goods game 
Since we use the FGF design, we start by checking whether we replicate previous findings from 
the  literature  in  our  Wave  1  experiment.  Following  the  classification  of  preference  types 
proposed by FGF, we divide our subjects into four categories. All subjects with a contribution 
schedule that has a significant positive slope (p<0.01, Spearman rank correlation) or shows a 
monotonically  increasing  pattern  are  classified  as  ‘Conditional  Cooperators’.  ‘Free  Riders’ 
contribute  nothing  in  any  case.  Subjects  who  increase  their  contribution  in  the  contribution 
schedule  up  to  some  maximum  and  decrease  it  thereafter  are  called  ‘Hump   shaped’.  The 




Cooperators, 21 (30) percent Free Riders, 3 (14) percent Hump shaped and 14 (6) percent Others. 
We run a χ
2 test on the joined data to check whether our distribution of types systematically 
differs from the one observed by FGF, and indeed the differences are borderline significant with 
χ
2(3)   = 6.44;  p = 0.092.  A  closer  look  at  the  percentage  numbers  reveals  that  the  greatest 
difference between our data and the FGF data is the smaller number of Hump shaped patterns we 
observe. This is not completely unexpected, as other replication studies of the FGF design (e.g., 
Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; Kocher et al., 2008; Thöni et al., 2009) also find a lower percentage 
of Hump shaped patterns. Due to the infrequent occurrence in our data we include the Hump 
shaped patterns into the category Others. If we compare our data to FGF using this reduced 
classification we observe no significant differences (χ
2(3)  = 0.771; p = 0.680). We conclude that, 
with regard to the most interesting categories, our Wave 1 experiment produced very similar 
results in comparison to the previous literature. 
 
3.2 Aggregate stability 
Before  we  classify  our  data  from  the  three  waves  into  categories  we  look  at  the  overall 
conditional cooperation scheme. Figure 1 shows the average conditional cooperation scheme for 
the three waves. The horizontal axis depicts the average contribution of the other three subjects, 
on which a subject can condition the own contribution. The vertical axis shows the average of all 
conditional contribution decisions in a wave. 
The curves for the three waves have a similar positive slope, indicating that on average 
subjects are Conditional Cooperators. There seems to be a slight positive trend, i.e. the level of 
the average conditional contribution is higher in later waves. We therefore test for systematic 
differences between the three times of measurement using the average conditional cooperation of 




                                                           
9 Because we focus on average effects, we do not make use of the within subject comparisons available in our data at 
this point and use Wilcoxon rank sum tests. The corresponding p values are p = .349 (p = .506) for the comparison 



























































Figure 1: Average conditional cooperation for the three waves. 
 
Overall,  conditional  contributions  are  thus  relatively  similar  over  the  course  of  five 
months  in  the  same  subject  pool.  Let  us  now  check  whether  the  same  holds  true  for  the 
distribution  of  types  in  the  population.  The  three  bars  in  Figure  2  show  the  frequency  of 
Conditional Cooperators, Free Riders and Others in the three waves of our experiment (ignore for 
the moment the dizzying lines between the bars). The distribution of types is apparently very 
similar across the three times of measurement. Free Riders account for between 19 percent (Wave 
3)  and  25  percent  (Wave  1)  of  the  population,  while  Conditional  Cooperators  account  for 
between 56 percent (Wave 3) and 60 percent (Wave 2). The distribution of preference types is not 
significantly different across the three times of measurement (χ
2(4) = 1.994; p = 0.737). This is in 
contrast to the results of Brosig et al. (2007) who report a decay of cooperation in the later 
measurements and speculate that their subjects learned the free rider strategy over time. While the 
learning hypothesis can neither explain our observations nor the observations of Muller et al. 
(2008),  our  data  point  to  a  different  explanation  for  preference  stability/instability  at  the 
individual  level.  As  we  will  report  in  the  next  sections,  our  findings  suggest  that  there  is 




(i.e., some individuals seem to have stable preferences, while others do not), which can be linked 
to individual differences in dispositional personality traits. 
To conclude, our observations show high aggregate stability over time. Observed changes 
in the distribution of types as well as in average conditional contribution schemes are both small 
and  insignificant.  In  all  three  waves  we  observe  shares  of  Conditional  Cooperators  (56 – 60 
percent) and Free Riders (19 – 25 percent), which are comparable to the shares reported in a 
number of previous studies. These studies have found that between 50 and 60 percent of people 
can  be  classified  as  cooperators,  while  between  20  and  30  percent  are  Free  Riders  (e.g., 
Fischbacher  and  Gächter,  2010;  Kurzban  and  Houser,  2005).  In  a  next  step,  we  investigate 
whether this aggregate stability is caused by stability of the contribution patterns at the individual 
level. 
 
3.3 Individual stability 
In order to test for individual stability, we first check whether subjects classified into one of the 
three classes in the first (second) wave remain in that class in the second (third) wave. With 72 
subjects in Waves 1 and 2 and 68 subjects in Wave 3, there are 140 opportunities for individual 
preferences  to  change  type  between  two  times  of  measurement.  In  93  cases  (66.4  percent) 
subjects do not change their type between two points in time. Preference stability is somewhat 
stronger between Wave 2 and Wave 3 (69.1 percent versus 63.9 percent between Wave 1 and 
2).
10 Given that we have three measures for each subject we can also check whether a subject 
belongs to the same type in all three waves. Exactly half of the 68 subjects we observe three 
times are classified as the same type in all three waves. 35.3 percent display stable Conditional 
Cooperation  preferences,  10.3  percent  stable  Free  Rider  preferences  and  4.4  percent  are 
consistently classified as Others. Consequently, underneath a high degree of aggregate stability 
there are quite some changes going on at the individual level. On the other hand, we can clearly 
refute the hypothesis that types are random. To do so we simulate the stability of types under the 
assumption that each player randomly picks a type in Wave 2 and Wave 3 with a probability that 
equals the observed relative frequency of the three types in our data. In the simulation we observe 
                                                           
10 This result is remarkably similar to the findings of Muller et al. (2008), who examine 60 subjects playing a 
comparable game in 5 repetitions within the same experimental session. In their design there are 240 opportunities 





that in 20.6 percent of the cases subjects are of the same type in two adjacent waves (100 runs, 
standard deviation 2.8 percentage points). The hypothesis of random types can be rejected at any 









































































Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Free rider Other Conditional cooperator
 
Figure 2: Distribution of types in the three waves and transitions between the times of 
measurement. All numbers denote percentages of the whole population in a given wave. 
 
What are the patterns of the type changes? The three bars in Figure 2 show the fractions of 
Conditional  Cooperators,  Free  Riders  and  Others  at  the  three  points  in  time.  The  numbers 
between the bars show the fraction of subjects that remains in a class or changes to another class 
in the subsequent wave. All numbers indicate the percentage of subjects relative to the whole 
population. For example, 58.3 percent of the subjects are classified as conditionally cooperative 
in Wave 1. About three fourths of these (and 43.1 percent of all subjects) remain Conditional 
Cooperators in Wave 2, while 5.6 percent of all subjects change from Conditional Cooperator to 
Free Rider  from  Wave  1  to  Wave  2 and  9.7  percent of  all  subjects  move  from  Conditional 
Cooperator  to  the  category  Others.  Bold  lines  correspond  to  observations  that  remain  in  a 
category. 
Overall, Figure 2 shows that the type of the Conditional Cooperator is clearly the most 




Surprisingly, the category of Free Riders seems to be rather unstable, especially between Wave 1 
and Wave 2. Among the 25 percent Free Riders in Wave 1, more than half change their type in 
Wave 2, most of those who change join the conditionally cooperative group. The fraction of Free 
Riders which stay in that category increases to almost 70 percent when we compare Wave 2 and 
Wave 3. However, the group of conditionally cooperative subjects is still more stable with about 
77 percent of the subjects remaining in the same class between Wave 2 and Wave 3. 
In conclusion, our results indicate that the very high aggregate stability of the distribution 
of types is not accompanied by an equally strong stability of types at the individual level. On the 
other  hand,  the  pattern  we  observe  reflects  certainly  some  non trivial  degree  of  individual 
stability. Overall, this finding corresponds with results of other recent studies. Blanco et al. (in 
press) and Brosig et al. (2007), for example, examine the consistency of individual and aggregate 
behavior with Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequality aversion. Both studies find that the 
model has predictive power at the aggregate level but less so at the individual level. In a next 
step,  we  will  use  our  questionnaire  data  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  Big Five  personality 
dimensions on preference heterogeneity and preference stability. 
 
3.4 Instrument check personality measure 
We first conduct an instrument check to assess whether our personality measure generates results 
similar to those found in other studies using the same instrument. Table 1 reports the means (ø) 
and standard deviations (sd) for the five TIPI subscales for the present study and three previous 
studies employing the TIPI (Donnellan et al., 2006; Ehrhart et al., 2009; Gosling et al., 2003). As 
Table 1 shows, the personality scores obtained in our study are very similar to those reported in 
the other three studies, indicating that the TIPI items performed well in our setting. 
 
  Present 
study 
  Gosling 
et al., 2003 
  Donnellan 
et al., 2006 
  Ehrhart 
et al., 2009 
  (n=72)    (n=1799)    (n=329)    (n=902) 
TIPI subscales  ø  sd    ø  sd    ø  sd    ø  sd 
Extraversion  4.8  1.7    4.4  1.5    5  1.5    4.8  1.5 
Agreeableness   5.3  1.2    5.2  1.1    5.4  1.1    4.9  1.1 
Conscientiousness   5.6  1.2    5.4  1.3    5.6  1.2    5.9  1.1 
Emotional Stability   4.8  1.4    4.8  1.4    3.2  1.5    4.9  1.4 
Openness to Experience   5.9  1    5.4  1.1    5.5  1.1    5.4  1.1 
Table 1: Means (ø) and standard deviations (sd) for the five TIPI subscales for the present 





3.5 Personality and cooperation preferences 
In  this  section,  we  investigate  whether  the  Big Five  personality  dimensions  are  related  to 
cooperation  preferences.  We  use  a  multinomial  logit  model  with  the  Big Five  personality 
dimensions as explanatory variables to explain the observed cooperation preference type in Wave 
1. Table 2 shows the results of these estimates. The omitted case is the Conditional Cooperator 
type. Table 2 shows that two Big Five dimensions are significantly related to the observed type in 
Wave 1, Agreeableness and Openness to Experience.  
Subjects scoring high on Agreeableness are significantly less likely to be classified as 
Free Riders compared to Conditional Cooperators. The same is true for the category Others. 
Furthermore, scoring high on Openness to Experience is associated with a higher probability of 
being classified as a Free Rider compared to being classified as a Conditional Cooperator. 
 
  Multinomial Logit 
  Free Rider  Other 
Extraversion   0.363  0.569 
  (0.363)  (0.429) 
Agreeableness   0.898**   0.924** 
  (0.390)  (0.420) 
Conscientiousness   0.020  0.384 
  (0.329)  (0.415) 
Emotional Stability  0.076   0.241 
  (0.342)  (0.405) 
Openness to Experience  0.782**   0.235 
  (0.395)  (0.360) 
Constant   1.060***   1.468*** 
  (0.340)  (0.402) 
Model chi square    20.1 
Prob > chi2    0.028 
Pseudo R squared    0.146 
N    72 
Table  2:  Multinomial  Logit  estimate  for  type  of  conditional 
cooperation  scheme  in  Wave  1.  Omitted  case  is  Conditional 
Cooperator.  Independent  variables  are  the  five  personality 
dimensions,  demeaned  and  standardized.  Standard  errors  in 
parentheses; ** denotes significance at 5 percent. 
 
What is the size of the personality effect? We use the multinomial logit model to predict 




presents the results. The horizontal axis shows the range of Agreeableness scores we observe in 
our experimental data. To facilitate the interpretation we de mean and standardize the values of 
Agreeableness.  The  size  of  the  estimated  effect  is  quite  remarkable.  A  subject  scoring  2.7 
standard deviations lower than the average on Agreeableness has an estimated probability of 
about  13  percent  to  be  classified  as  Conditional  Cooperator.  For  the  average  subject  the 
probability is about 63 percent and increases up to 86 percent for a subject scoring 1.4 standard 
deviations higher than the average on Agreeableness. Conversely, the estimated probability of 
being classified as Free Rider drops from 51 percent to a mere 8 percent if we compare the least 
to the most agreeable subject in our sample. 
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Figure 3: Panel A: Estimated probability of being classified as either ‘Conditional Cooperator’, ‘Free 
Rider’, or ‘Other’ dependent on the Big Five dimension Agreeableness (demeaned and normalized) in 
Wave 1. Panel B: Estimated probability of being classified into one of five classes during all three 
waves of the experiment dependent on Agreeableness. ‘Consistent FR (CC)’ are subjects classified as 
Free Rider (Conditional Cooperator) in all three waves; 2timesFR (CC) are subjects classified as Free 
Rider  (Conditional  Cooperator)  in  two  out  of  the  three  waves;  ‘All  other’  denotes  all  remaining 
patterns. 
 
What about time effects? We can use our personality measures elicited in the experiment 
of  Wave  1  to  predict  the  type  in  Wave  2,  or  Wave  3.  It  turns  out  that  the  influence  of 
Agreeableness on the types Free Rider and Conditional Cooperator is strong and significant in all 
three waves. The positive connection between Agreeableness and the type Other observed in 




Openness  to  Experience  on  the  category  Free  Rider  is  insignificant  in  Wave  2  and  only 
marginally significant in Wave 3.  
How are personality measures associated with preference stability over time? Given that 
we have three types of cooperation preferences and three times of measurement, there are ten 
possible combinations of types. A subject who is classified as Conditional Cooperator in all three 
waves  is  categorized  as  ConsistentCC.  Likewise,  we  observe  three  times  Free  Riders 
(ConsistentFR). Subjects who are classified as either Conditional Cooperator or Free Rider in two 
out of the three waves are categorized as 2timesCC and 2timesFR respectively. All remaining 
combinations are in the same group (All other).
11 We run a multinomial logit model for these five 
categories. Like before, only the personality dimension Agreeableness shows significant results. 
Panel B of Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities dependent on Agreeableness. Clearly, the 
probability of ConsistentFR is now very strongly connected to the Agreeableness measure. It 
ranges  from  87  percent  for  the  lowest  observed  Agreeableness  to  virtually  zero  for  an 
Agreeableness score that is a standard deviation above the mean. The category 2timesFR shows a 
similar pattern. On the other end of the scale we observe that the probability of ConsistentCC 
rises  from  virtually  zero  to  43  percent  for  the  highest  Agreeableness  score  observed  in  our 
sample.  The  category  2timesCC  displays  a  similar  pattern.  Finally,  unlike  in  Panel  A,  the 
remaining observations are more likely to be associated with higher scores of Agreeableness. 
Taken  together,  our  results  suggest  that  the  personality  dimension  Agreeableness  can 
contribute  to  our  understanding  of  the  psychological  foundations  of  cooperation  preference 
heterogeneity and stability. Concerning preference heterogeneity, we find that Free Riders and 
Conditional  Cooperators  are  characterized  by  different  levels  of  Agreeableness.  Regarding 
preference stability, we find that higher (lower) levels of Agreeableness are associated with more 
stable preferences for conditional cooperation (free riding).  
 
3.6 Predicting types 
In the beginning of the paper we have argued that economic theory is about making predictions 
and that making predictions is enormously facilitated if peoples' tastes are stable. So far we have 
shown  that  cooperation  preferences  are  stable  at  the  aggregate  level.  If  we  are  interested  in 
                                                           
11 We do not introduce a separate category for subjects classified as Other in all three waves because (i) only three 




aggregate outcomes, a prediction that simply extrapolates the observed share would be fairly 
accurate. At the individual level we find that about one third of the subjects changes preference 
type between two waves. What does this mean for the predictive power of potential models 
predicting individual types? In the following, we use the data from Wave 1 and Wave 2 to predict 
a subject's type in Wave 3. We then evaluate the predictions with the data from Wave 3. We 
calculate the accuracy for different methods of predicting individual types in Wave 3, making 
increasingly  use  of  the  information  we  have  about  our  subjects  from  Waves  1  and  2.  The 
accuracy of a model is simply the number of subjects for whom we correctly predict the type in 
relation to all subjects. 
A first benchmark is a prediction that completely ignores preference stability and does not 
take  information  from  Waves  1  and  2  into  account.  Given  that  there  are  three  types  of 
cooperation preferences we would make the uneducated guess of predicting each of the three 
types with equal probability. In this case we would predict the correct type in 33.3 percent of the 
cases (in expectation).
12 
If we only consider information about the aggregate outcome in Waves 1 and 2 to predict 
individual behavior in Wave 3, our best estimate for a subject's type would be the type that occurs 
most frequently, which is the Conditional Cooperator. In this case we would be correct for all 
Conditional Cooperators and wrong for all other types. Thus our prediction would be correct in 
55.9 percent of the cases, which is the fraction of Conditional Cooperators observed in Wave 3. 
In a next step we make use of individual information from Waves 1 and 2. We run a 
multinomial logit model using the data from Wave 2 with two dummies for a subject’s type in 
Wave 1 as explanatory variables (CCt 1 and FRt 1). This model allows predicting probabilities for 
the types in Wave 3, dependent on their type in Wave 2. We then assign to each individual the 
type with the highest predicted probability and list our observations in a so called confusion 
matrix. Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results. The model predicts the conditional cooperative type 
for 54 subjects and the type Other for the remaining 14 subjects observed in Wave 3. None of the 
subjects is predicted to fall into the category Free Riders. The reason for this is that there is a 
substantial fraction of the Free Riders in Wave 1 that move to another category in Wave 2 (see 
Figure 2). The nine numbers in the center of the table for Model 1 demonstrate the accuracy of 
                                                           
12 If pi is the predicted probability of type i (i = 1,…,n) and qi is the true probability, then the prediction is correct 
with probability ∑ piqi. If all pi are identical then the sum reduces to 1/n. Thus for three types the hit rate is one third, 




the prediction. Among the 54 subjects who are predicted to be Conditional Cooperators, 33 turn 
out to be of that type in Wave 3, 11 are Free Riders and 10 are Others. Bold numbers on the main 
diagonal are the observations for which the prediction is correct. The predictive success of the 
model is simply the number of correct predictions in relation to all observations in Wave 3 (68). 
The rightmost column shows the accuracy of Model 1, which is in this case 58.8 percent.  
In Model 2 we use the Big Five personality dimensions to estimate a multinomial logit 
model with a data from Wave 2. This model predicts only the types Conditional Cooperator and 
Free Rider. This reflects the results discussed in the previous section that personality measures 
are informative for the distinction between Free Riders and Conditional Cooperators, but not 
when  it  comes  to  the  category  Others.  Model  2  does  not  take  into  account  the  transition 
probabilities. The personality measures allow us to predict the correct type in 63.2 percent of the 
cases in Wave 3.
13 
 
         Observed type    
       Cond. Coop.  Free Rider  Other   
   Predicted type     38  13  17  Accuracy 
Model 1  Cond. Coop.  54  33  11  10   
  Covariates: CCt 1, FRt 1  Free Rider  0  0  0  0  58.8% 
   Other  14  5  2  7    
Model 2  Cond. Coop.  62  38  8  16   
  Covariates: Big Five   Free Rider  6  0  5  1  63.2% 
   Other  0  0  0  0    
Model 3  Cond. Coop.  45  32  4  9   
  Covariates: CCt 1, FRt 1, Big Five  Free Rider  9  1  7  1  67.6% 
   Other  14  5  2  7    
Model 4  Cond. Coop.  46  33  3  10   
  Covariates: CCt 1, FRt 1,  Free Rider  8  0  8  0  70.6% 
  Agreeableness, interaction  Other  14  5  2  7    
Table 3: Confusion matrices for four models to predict types in Wave 3 based on observations in Wave 1 and 
Wave 2. 
 
In Model 3 we combine the personality measures with the lagged type of a subject. This 
model  predicts  the  occurrence  of  all  three  types  and  achieves  an  accuracy  of  67.6  percent. 
Finally, in Model 4 we introduce interaction terms between the personality measures and the 
lagged type. This allows accounting for the fact that personality and the probability of changing 
                                                           
13 We use the experimental data from Wave 2 in order to estimate with the same dependent variable as in the three 
other models. Alternatively, we could predict the type using the data from Wave 1 or both waves. A model using 
only Wave 1 data predicts the occurrence of all three types but results in an identical hit rate. If we use the joint data 




type between two points in time are likely to be related. To keep the number of explanatory 
variables low we only interact the most important personality dimension (Agreeableness) with 
the lagged type. Model 4 improves the prediction relative to Model 3 and achieves an accuracy of 
70.6 percent.  
Accuracy might not be the only performance measure we are interested in. An alternative 
approach is to ask which model performs best in detecting a type (precision). If we look at the 
type  Conditional  Cooperator,  clearly  Model  2  scores  best  on  precision.  All  38  Conditional 
Cooperators observed in Wave 3 are predicted to be of that type. For the type Free Rider Model 4 
performs best, identifying 8 out of the 13 we observe in Wave 3. In all models precision in 
predicting the type Other is relatively low. We conclude that, despite the fact that a substantial 
fraction  of  the  subjects  change  their  type  between  waves,  information  about  subjects’  past 
behavior  in  combination  with  personality  measures  is  highly  informative  when  we  aim  at 
predicting individual types. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Economic theory almost always implicitly assumes that preferences are stable. Yet, empirical 
evidence  on  the  stability  of  preferences  is  very  limited.  Furthermore,  economists  routinely 
classify  preferences  into  different  types  without  establishing  the  underpinnings  of  preference 
heterogeneity. The goal of this study was to investigate the stability of cooperation preferences 
over  time  and  to  explore  the  psychological  foundations  of  preference  heterogeneity  and 
preference stability. The main contribution of our study is threefold.  
First, we report high aggregate stability of cooperation preferences over time. This finding 
complements Blanco et al. (in press) who report high aggregate stability of social preferences 
across different games. Taken together these results suggest that theories of social preferences 
can “provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the 
consequences  of  any  change  in  circumstances”,  as  stipulated  by  Friedman  (1953,  p.  4).  Our 
finding of high aggregate stability is also interesting, as it suggests that the heterogeneity of 
other regarding preferences reported in previous studies is a temporally stable phenomenon. In 
line  with  earlier  research,  we  find  that  the  most  important  preference  types  are  Conditional 
Cooperators and Free Riders, which has important theory and policy consequences (see Gächter, 




Second,  we  provide  evidence  on  the  stability  of  individual  preferences  over  time. 
Individual level preference stability is an important prerequisite of signaling games or reputation 
mechanisms. Learning another players’ type through signaling makes only sense if there is such a 
thing as a stable type (see e.g. the models by Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008, or Levine, 1998). 
We  find  that  individual level  stability  of  cooperation  preferences  over  time  is  lower  than 
aggregate  stability.  Still,  individual  stability  is  high  enough  so  that  knowledge  about  an 
individual’s past behavior offers substantial informational content when it comes to predicting 
future behavior. Our results also highlight another interesting aspect. While previous work has 
focused on one dimension of preference heterogeneity, i.e., heterogeneity in terms of preference 
types, our findings suggest there is a second dimension researchers should pay attention to, i.e., 
heterogeneity in terms of preference stability. Some individuals seem to have stable preferences, 
while others do not. However, given the small number of studies on the within subject stability of 
cooperation preferences, more research is certainly needed for a proper understanding of this 
phenomenon. 
Third, we provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences. 
Our results suggest that Free Riders and Conditional Cooperators identified in our experiments 
are  indeed  subjects  with  different  personalities,  as  measured  by  the  Big Five  dimension 
‘Agreeableness’. The relation between personality and cooperation preferences is particularly 
strong  for  consistent  Conditional  Cooperators  and  consistent  Free  Riders.  Information  about 
subjects’ personality traits improve the accuracy of our predictions for Wave 3 types beyond 
what was possible relying only on behavioral data. 
In conclusion, our results indicate that there is heterogeneity of individual behavior in 
terms  of  both  preference  types  and  preference  stability,  which  can  be  linked  to  individual 
differences  in  personality.  Applying  an  individual  differences  approach  to  investigate  the 
importance of dispositional factors may accordingly prove useful for our understanding of the 
heterogeneity and stability of cooperation preferences. We believe that future theoretical and 
empirical  research  on  social  preferences  would  benefit  substantially  from  incorporating 
personality and attitude variables. We therefore call for more interdisciplinary research that spans 
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Appendix A:  
Conditional contribution schedules per subject 
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Appendix A: Individual data. Three horizontally adjacent panels show the conditional cooperation scheme for a 
subject in Wave 1, Wave 2 and Wave 3 respectively. Letters denote the classification: CC for Conditional 






Appendix B:  
Instructions (not intended for publication) 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of 
money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. The instructions which we have 
distributed to you, are solely for your private information. It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants 
during the experiment. Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments.  
You will participate in this experiment three times over the course of the next months. The decisions you 
make in one experiment will have no influence on the outcomes or payoffs of the following experiments. Your 
decisions in the first experiment will therefore not influence outcomes or payoffs of the second or third experiment 
and vice versa. In each of the three independent experiments, the participants will be randomly divided into groups 
of four members. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. The people sitting right next to you are 
most likely not in your group. The composition of the groups will change by random after each experiment. In each 
experiment your group will therefore consist of different participants. Nobody will know who is in which group. 
Neither before, nor after the experiment, will you learn which people are/were in your group. The decisions you 
made in the first experiment will be unknown to your group mates in the second experiment. The same holds for the 
third experiment. 
This experiment will be conducted under full anonymity. During and after the experiment your identity in 
the experiment will remain undisclosed. Except us, the experimenters, nobody can associate certain decisions with 
certain people. During the experiment, your entire earnings will be calculated in Points. At the end of the experiment 
the total amount of Points you have earned will be paid to you in cash. 
 
The decision situation 
You will later learn how the actual experiment will be conducted. We first introduce you to the basic decision 
situation. At the end of the description of the decision you will find control questions that help you to gain an 
understanding of the decision situation. You will be a member of a group of 4 people. Each group member has to 
decide on the division of 20 Points. You can either put these 20 Points into your private account or you can invest 
them fully or partially into a project. Each Point you do not invest into the project will automatically remain in your 
private account. 
 
Your income from the private account 
For each Point you put into your private account, you will earn exactly one Point. For example, if you put 20 Points 
into your private account (which implies that you do not invest anything into the project) you will earn exactly 20 
Points from the private account. If you put 6 Points into your private account, you will receive an income of 6 Points 





Your income from the project 
From the amount you invest into the project each group member will get the same payoff. Of course, you will also 
get a payoff from the Points the other group members invest into the project. The income for each group member 
will be determined as follows:  
Income from the project = sum of contributions to the project × 0.4 
For example, if the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 Points, then you and all other members of 
your group will get a payoff of 60 × 0.4 = 24 Points from the project. If the four group members together contribute 
10 Points to the project, you and all other members of your group will get a payoff of 10 × 0.4 = 4 Points from the 
project. 
 
Your total income 
Your total income in Points is the sum of your income from the private account and your income from the project: 
Income from the private account (= 20 – contribution to the project) + Income from the project (= 0.4 × sum 
of contributions to the project) = Total income 
 
Control questions 
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain a better understanding of the calculation of 
your income that varies with your decision about how you distribute your 20 Points.  
1. Each group member has 20 Points. Assume that none of the four group members (including you) contributes 
anything to the project. What will your total income be? What will the total income of each of the other group 
members be? 
 
2. Each group member has 20 Points. You invest 20 Points into the project. From the other three members of the 
group each one contributes 20 Points to the project. What will your total income be? What will the total income of 
each of the other group members be? 
 
3. Each group member has 20 Points. The other 3 members contribute in total 30 Points to the project.  
What will your total income be, if you have – in addition to the 30 Points – invested 0 Points into the project?  
What will your total income be, if you have – in addition to the 30 Points – invested 8 Points into the project?  
What will your total income be, if you have – in addition to the 30 Points – invested 15 Points into the project? 
 
4. Each group member has 20 Points. Assume that you invest 8 Points into the project.  
What will your total income be, if the other group members –in addition to your 8 Points– together contribute 7 
Points to the project?  
What will your total income be, if the other group members –in addition to your 8 Points– together contribute 12 
Points to the project?  
What will your total income be, if the other group members –in addition to your 8 Points– together contribute 22 






You will now learn how the actual experiment will be conducted. The experiment involves the decision situation we 
just explained to you. Each participant has to make two types of decisions. In the following we will call them 
"unconditional contribution" and "contribution table". With the unconditional contribution to the project you have to 
decide how many of the 20 Points you want to invest into the project. After you have determined your unconditional 
contribution your second task is to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table you have to indicate for each 
possible average contribution of the other three group members (rounded to the next integer) how many Points you 
want  to  contribute  to  the  project.  You  can  condition  your  contribution  on  the  contribution  of  the  other  group 
members. This will be immediately clear to you if you take a look at the following table. In the experiment, this table 
will be presented to you: 
 
Contribution Table: 
0   
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
8   
9   
10   
11   
12   
13   
14   
15   
16   
17   
18   
19   
20   
 
The numbers are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other three group members to the 
project. You simply have to insert into each entry field how many Points you want to contribute to the project – 
conditional on the indicated average contribution of the others. You have to make an entry into each entry field. For 
example, you will have to indicate how much you contribute to the project if the other three contribute on average 0 
Points to the project, how much you contribute if the other three contribute on average 1, 2, or 3 Points etc. In each 
entry field you can insert all integer numbers from 0 to 20. 
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have filled in their 
contribution table, in each group a random mechanism will select a group member. For the randomly determined 
subject only the contribution table will be the payoff relevant decision. For the other three group members that are 
not selected by the random mechanism, only the unconditional contribution will be the payoff relevant decision. 




know whether you will be selected by the random mechanism. You will therefore have to think carefully about both 
types of decisions because both can become relevant for you. Two examples should make this clear. 
 
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that you have been selected by the random mechanism. This implies that your 
relevant decision will be your contribution table. For the other three group members the unconditional contribution is 
the  relevant  decision.  Assume  they  have  made  unconditional  contributions  of  0,  2,  and  4  Points.  The  average 
contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 2 Points. If you have indicated in your contribution table that 
you will contribute 1 Point if the others contribute 2 Points on average, then the total contribution to the project is 
given  by  0+2+4+1=7  Points.  All  group  members,  therefore,  earn  0.4×7=2.8  Points  from  the  project  plus  their 
respective income from the private account. If you have instead indicated in your contribution table that you will 
contribute 19 Points if the others contribute two Points on average, then the total contribution of the group to the 
project is given by 0+2+4+19=25. All group members therefore earn 0.4×25=10 Points from the project plus their 
respective income from the private account. 
 
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that you have not been selected by the random mechanism which implies that for 
you and two other group members the unconditional contribution is taken as the payoff relevant decision. Assume 
your unconditional contribution is 16 Points and those of the other two group members are 18 and 20 Points. The 
average unconditional contribution of you and the two other group members, therefore, is 18 Points. If the group 
member who has been selected by the random mechanism indicates in her contribution table that she will contribute 
1 Point if the other three group members contribute on average 18 Points, then the total contribution of the group to 
the project is given by 16+18+20+1=55 Points. All group members will therefore earn 0.4×55=22 Points from the 
project  plus  their  respective  income  from  the  private  account.  If  instead  the  randomly  selected  group  member 
indicates in her contribution table that she contributes 19 if the others contribute on average 18 Points, then the total 
contribution  of  that  group  to  the  project  is  16+18+20+19=73  Points.  All  group  members  will  therefore  earn 
0.4×73=29.2 Points from the project plus their respective income from the private account. 
 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows. Each group member is assigned a 
group member number between 1 and 4. The computer will randomly select one participant. This participant will, 
after all participants have made their unconditional contribution and have filled in their contribution table, throw a 4 
sided  die.  The  number  that  shows  up  will  be  entered  into  the  computer.  If  the  selected  participant  throws  the 
membership number that has been assigned to you, then for you your contribution table will be relevant and for the 
other  group  members  the  unconditional  contribution  will  be  the  payoff relevant  decision.  Otherwise,  your 
unconditional contribution is the relevant decision. 
After you made the unconditional contribution and filled in the contribution table we ask you to make some 
estimates about your peer group members. The other members of your group of four also made a decision about their 
unconditional contribution. Your task is to estimate the average unconditional contribution to the project (rounded to 
an integer) of the other members of your group. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimates. If your estimate 
is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual average unconditional contribution of the 




estimate deviates by one Point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional Points, a deviation by 2 Points still 
earns you 1 additional Point. If your estimate deviates by 3 or more Points from the correct result, you will not get 
any additional points. 
 
 
Your income in the experiment 
Your total income in Points in the experiment is the sum of your income from your private account and the income 
from the project plus your income from right estimates: 
Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project) + Income from the project (= 0.4 × 
sum of all contributions to the project) + Income from your right estimates = Total income 
 
Control questions 
Please answer the following control questions. The following contribution table is filled with hypothetical values: 
 
0  1 
1  12 
2  8 
3  8 
4  5 
5  9 
6  1 
7  20 
8  6 
9  8 
10  0 
11  19 
12  14 
13  20 
14  11 
15  12 
16  8 
17  1 
18  15 
19  0 
20  17 
 
Assume that you have been selected by the random mechanism. This implies that your relevant decision will 
be your contribution table. For the other three group members the unconditional contribution is the relevant decision. 
 
1. Assume you filled in the table above and the other three group members made unconditional contributions of 10, 
12, and 14 Points. What will be your contribution according to the table above? What will be the total contribution to 
the project of your group accordingly? 
 
2. Assume you filled in the table above and the other three group members made unconditional contributions of 4, 8, 
and 18 Points. What will be your contribution according to the table above? What will be the total contribution to the 





Assume that you have not been selected by the random mechanism which implies that for you and two other 
group members the unconditional contribution is taken as the payoff relevant decision. 
 
3. Assume your unconditional contribution is 6 Points and those of the other two group members are 8 and 10 Points. 
What will be the contribution of the fourth group member according to the table above? What will be the total 
contribution of your group to the project accordingly? 
 
4. Assume your unconditional contribution is 0 Points and those of the other two group members are 4 and 5 Points. 
What will be the contribution of the fourth group member according to the table above? What will be the total 
contribution of your group to the project accordingly? 